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THE IMPACT OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT ON THE NEW MEXICO
CRIMINALCODE
CHARLES W. DANIELSt

The impact of the Equal Rights Amendment on the criminal
law in New Mexico should be minimal. In 1963, the New Mexico
legislature enacted the first codification of the criminal laws of
New Mexico' and in the process, revised and updated much of
the previously existing law. 2 The statutory definitions of most
criminal acts in the New Mexico statutes as well as the
punishment 3 which may be imposed on conviction apply with
equal force to members of both sexes. Not surprisingly, it is in the
area of sexual offenses that the statutes are more likely to specify
a particular sex of the actor or of the victim.
The Equal Rights Amendment introduces a new factor into the
pre-Amendment controversy concerning the appropriate standard to be applied in reviewing classifications based on sex. In
many cases the courts have upheld sex-based classifications
unless the challenger overcame a presumption of validity and
demonstrated that the distinction was not "based on some
reasonable classification."' 4 In other cases, courts have taken the
position that, like classifications based on race, 5 ancestry 6 and
financial status, 7 they must be subjected to the "most rigid
scrutiny" 8 to determine whether the distinction is necessary to
serve a compelling state interest. 9 The Supreme Court of
California, in an in bank opinion, recently observed:
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico.
i. Laws 1963, ch. 303, N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 40A-1-1 to 29-25 (2d Repl. 1972).
2. Weihofen, The Prop osed New Mexico Criminal Code, I Natural Resources J. 123 (1961).
3. N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 40A-29-1 to -25 (2d Repl. 1972), "Disposition of Offenders," makes no
distinction between female and male offenders. The only possible discrimination in punishment
appearing in the statutes is in N.M. Stat. Ann. §§42-3-1 to -3 (2d Repl. 1972), a 1921 act which
permits female prisoners to be confined in penal institutions of other states when adequate
facilities do not exist in New Mexico. There is no longer any justification for the continued
existence of this act, and it should therefore be repealed. Cf., United States ex rel. Robinson v.
York, 281 F.Supp. 8 (D.Conn. 1968); Commonwealth v. Daniels. 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400
(1968).
4. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61 (1961). See Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection:
Do We Need a Constitutional A mendment?, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1499 (1971).
5. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967).
6. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
7. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1970); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
8. Korematsu v. United Stated, 323 U.S. 214, 216(1944).
9. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Sex, like race and lineage, is an immutable trait, a status into
which the class members are locked by the accident of birth. What
differentiates sex from nonsuspect statuses, such as intelligence or
physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect
classifications is that the characteristic frequently bears no relation
to ability to perform or contribute to society. .

.

. The result is

that the whole class is relegated to an inferior legal status without
regard to the capabilities or characteristics of its individual
members. .

.

. Where the relation between characteristic and evil

to be prevented is so tenuous, courts must look closely at
classifications based on that characteristic lest outdated social
10
stereotypes result in invidious laws or practices.

It is not yet clear what standard of review will be articulated by
the courts in responding to challenges under the Equal Rights
Amendment. It does seem obvious, however, that any law
singling out members of one sex or the other by its terms will be
subjected to close scrutiny. The Amendment is based on the
principle that "the law must deal with particular attributes of
individuals, not with a classification based on the broad and
impermissible attribute of sex."" This would not prevent classifications which are expressed in terms of sex but are in reality
based on physical characteristics unique to one sex.
Some of the classifications in the statutes may withstand
constitutional challenges under the Equal Rights Amendment,
but others are unlikely to survive. Since the courts must resolve
all doubts as to the proper interpretation and construction of a
criminal statute in favor of the defendant, 12 neither sex may be
punished for offenses which impermissibly discriminate on the
basis of sex. For this reason, the Legislature may not depend on
the courts to extend coverage of the penal provisions to members
of the sex excluded by the express statutory language.
This article will attempt to identify those portions of the New
may be subject to challenge under
Mexico Criminal Code which 13
Amendment.
the Equal Rights
THE "UNWRITTEN LAW"

At common law, a man who discovered his wife and her lover
10. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, I Cai.d 1, 18, 485 P.2d 529. 540, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 340 (1971).
II. Brown, Emerson, Falk and Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional
Basisfor EqualRightsfor Women, 80 Yale L. J. 871, 893 (1971).
12. State v. Ortiz, 78 N.M. 507, 433 P.2d 92 (Ct.App. 1969); State v. Couch, 52 N.M. 127, 193
P.2d 405 (1948); Territory v. Davenport, 17 N.M. 214. 124 P. 795 (1912).

13. There appear to be no sex discrimination problems in the New Mexico criminal case law
which would require legislative correction.
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in the act of committing adultery and killed either in the heat of
passion was guilty of no more than manslaughter. 14 New Mexico,
however, is one of those few states'5 which has gone even further
and transformed this rule into an absolute license to kill:
The "unwritten law" as a defense.-Upon a prosecution for
murder or manslaughter, in addition to other defenses which may
be offered, it may be shown as a complete defense that the
homicide resulted from the person's use of deadly force upon
another who was at the time of the homicide in the act of having
sexual intercourse with the accused's wife. In order for this defense
to be available to the accused, the accused and his wife must have
been living together as husband and wife at the time of the
16
homicide.

This statute managed to survive the 1963 revision and codification, but it will not be able to withstand a constitutional challenge
based on the Equal Rights Amendment. It permits the husband
to kill his wife's lover, 17 but grants no such justification for the
wife to kill her husband's lover.'8 There is no rational basis, and
certainly no compelling state interest to justify this sex-based
discrimination.
The legislature may choose one of three courses of action in
dealing with this statute.
One course is to do nothing and let the courts deal with the
problem when it arises. This option is unsatisfactory not only for
the uncertainty it injects into the criminal law, but also for the
reason that it deprives the legislature of the opportunity to take
the various public policy factors into account in reshaping this
law. A failure to act on the part of the legislature would probably
result in a judicial decision extending the defense to wives who
catch their husbands in flagrante delicto, since under the strict
rules of penal construction the court could hardly resolve the
problem by denying the defense to those who are specifically
included in the statute.
A second possibility is to avoid the sex discrimination problem
by rewriting the statute to allow wives the defense now afforded
14. Weihofen, The Proposed New Mexico Criminal Code, I Natural Resources J. 123, 137
(1961), and cases cited therein.
15. See, e.g., Tex. Penal Code, Art. 1220 (Vernon's 1961); Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-9(4) (1953).
16. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-2-4 (2d Repl. 1972).
17. One who plans to take advantage of this kind of statute should practice his marksmanship,
since it does not justify killing the spouse. See, e.g., Morris v. State, 442 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Cr. App.
1969).
18. Cf Barr v. State, 172 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1943); Reed v. State, 59 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. 1933).
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to husbands alone. Before doing so, however, it would be wise to
re-examine the social policy justifications for this license to kill. It
is a defense that is inconsistent with the other 19statutory defenses
20
to homicide, not being grounded on necessity or accident. It
sanctions what would be first-degree murder 2 ' against one
committing an act which is not even punishable under the
Criminal Code.2 2 If the statute is based on some sort of property
concept of a husband's possessory rights to his wife, "a personal
'prize' whose value is enhanced by sole ownership," 23 its
existence cannot be justified. If it is based on the possibility that a
killing under such circumstances may be the result of uncontrollable emotional forces, its language sweeps more broadly than is
necessary to deal with that situation and also fails to take into
may result in similar or more
account other situations which
24
compelling emotional forces.
Finally, the statute could be repealed. 25 This would be the
course of action most consistent with our society's belief in the
sanctity of human life, as well as the one which recognizes the
value of rationality in the criminal law.
JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE

The only other provision in the homicide article of the New
Mexico Code which makes a sexual distinction is that making a
homicide by any person justifiable "when committed in the
necessary defense of his life, his family or his property, or in
unlawful action directed
necessarily defending against any
26
against himself, his wife or family."
19. N.M. Stat. Ann.§§40A-2-7. 8 (2d Repl. 1972).
20. N.M. Stat. Ann.. §40A-2-6(2d Repl. 1972).
21. The defense is available even when the killing was done with malice and premeditation.
22. New Mexico has no crime of adultery. It is, however, one of the grounds for divorce. N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 22-7-1 (1953). The unlawful cohabitation statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-10-2 (Repl.
1972). which imposes a maximum punishment of a judicial warning on a first offender, is
applicable only when the offenders are "cohabitating together as man and wife." The unwritten
law defense is not available unless "the accused and his wife . . . have been living together as
husband and wife at the time of the homicide." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-2-4 (2d Repl. 1972).
23. Comment, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objective of
the Consent Standard, 62 Yale L.J. 55, 72 (1952).
24. For example, where a parent finds someone in the act of sexually abusing her or his child.
25. This would not negate the possibility of other defenses being available, if the circumstances
should warrant. The facts could be such as to reduce a charge from first degree murder to second
degree murder, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-2-IB (2d Repl. 1972), voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-2-3 (2d Repl. 1972), or to justify an acquittal on grounds of excusable
homicide, N.M. Stat. Ann. §40A-2-6 (2d Repl. 1972). or justifiable homicide, N.M. Stat.
Ann.§40A-2-8 (2d Repl. 1972).
26. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40A-2-8 (2d Repl. 1972).
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There is no rational basis for distinguishing between the
situation in which a husband defends against an unlawful action
directed against his wife and that in which a wife defends against
an unlawful action directed against her husband. The social
stereotype of the husband as the defender of his weak and
helpless wife not only is inconsistent with the Equal Rights
Amendment but also ignores current realities.
Amendment of this statute could be a simple matter: Delete
the reference to the wife in the last line. A spouse would then be
included in the more inclusive term "family." This would also
make this line consistent with the first line of the statute, which
makes no specific reference to a spouse. If the statute is to be
amended, however, the most desirable solution would be to
remove all references to the sex of the actor:
When committed in the necessary defense of one's life, family or
property, or in necessarily defending against any unlawful action
directed against one's self or family.
ABORTION

The New Mexico abortion statutes 27 exhibit an apparent facial
impartiality by not specifying the sex of those persons who may
be punished under their provisions.2 8 Statutes similar to these,
however, are now being subjected to constitutional attack in
many jurisdictions on various grounds, primarily the right of
privacy in matters relating to marriage and sex. 2 9 Challenges to a
number of abortion statutes are now before the United States
Supreme Court 30 and should be decided this term. 31 If the
27. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§40A-5-1 to -3 (2d Repl. 1972).
28. Although the person who is prevented from obtaining an abortion is necessarily a woman.
29. See, e.g., Poe v. Menghini, 339 F.Supp. 986 (D.Kan. 1972); Corkey v. Edwards, 322
F.Supp. 1248 W.D.N.C. 1971; appeal docketed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3019 (U.S. July II, 1971) (No. 71-92);
Doe v. Scott, 321 F.Supp. 1385 (N.D.IlI. 1971); Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F.Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio
1970); Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F.Supp. 1217 (E.D.La. 1970);
Babbity v. McCann, 310 F.Supp. 293 E.D. Wis) appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1 (1970); State v. Scott,
260 La. 190, 262 So.2d 431 (1972); Beechan v. Leahy, 287 A.2d 836 (Vt. 1972).
For an analysis of the New Mexico Abortion Law which concludes the law is "unnecessary,
undesirable and unconstitutional," see Sutin, New Mexico's 1969 Criminal Abortion Law, 10
Natural Resources J. 591, 612 (1970). The constitutionality of the New Mexico statute is now
under consideration in State v. Strance, (Ct.App. No. 96 1).
30. Doe v. Bolton, restored to calendarfor reargument, 92 S.Ct. 2477 (U.S. June 26, 1972) (No.
70-40); Roe v. Wade, restored to calendar for reargument, 92 S.Ct. 2476 (U.S. June 26, 1972) (No.
70-18); Kruye v. Ohio, petition for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. July 13, 1972) (No. 72-69);
Markle v. Abele, petition for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3136 (U.S. July 10, 1972) (No. 72-56): Spears
v. Mississippi, appeal docketed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3028 (U.S. May 23, 1972) (No. 71-1528): Corkey v.
Edwards, appeal docketed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3019 (U.S. July II, 1971) (No. 71-92); Hefferman v. Doe,
appeal docketed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3018 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1971) (No. 70-106); Hanrahan v. Doe, appeal
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abortion statutes are to be invalidated, it is likely that the basis
will be something other than the Equal Rights Amendment.3 2
ABANDONMENT OF DEPENDENT

Men as well as women are protected by the Equal
Amendment against sex-based discrimination. A criminal
which would be partially unenforceable after passage
Amendment is the abandonment of dependent statute,
provides:

Rights
statute
of the
which

Abandonment of dependent consists of:
A. a man having the ability and means to provide for his wife
and minor child's support, and abandoning or failing to provide for
the support of such dependent and thereby leaving such wife or
minor child dependent upon public support; or
B. a woman having the ability and means to provide for her
minor child's support, and abandoning or failing to provide for the
support of such minor child and thereby leaving such child
dependent upon public support.
Whoever commits abandonment of dependent is guilty of a
fourth degree felony.33 [Emphasis supplied.]

In its present form, the statute could not be used as a basis for
prosecution of a woman who abandons her husband. If the
Legislature wishes to retain the criminal sanction for use in that
situation, it must amend the statute to impose the same punishment on a wife who abandons her husband under similar
circumstances. Any amendment should be consistent with the
legislative treatment of Chapter 57 of the statutes governing
rights and duties of husband and wife.3 4
Assuming the Legislature wishes to make each spouse responsible for the support of the other and assuming further that it
wishes to impose a criminal sanction on a spouse who breaches
that duty, it should amend the statute to read:
docketed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3018 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1971) (No. 70-105); Thompson v. Texas,- appeal
docketed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3023 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1971) (No. 71-1200); Rodgers v. Danforth. appeal
docketed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3018 (U.S. Feb. 8, 1971)(No. 70-89).
31. The Court appears 'o be closely divided on the abortion issues. It heard arguments in two
cases last term and now has called for reargument this term. Doe v. Bolton, restored to calendarfor
reargument, 92 S.Ct. 2477 (U.S. June 26, 1972) (No. 70-40); Roe v. Wade, restored to calendar for
reargument, 92 S.Ct. 2476 (U.S. June 26, 1972) (No. 70-18).
32. If the Supreme Court should decide the states legitimately may regulate or prohibit
abortions, the abortion statutes could be upheld against an Equal Rights challenge on the basis of
the "unique physical characteristics" test. See, generally, Pitt, The Equal Rights Amendment-Positive Panacea or Negative Nostrum?, 59 Kentucky L.J. 953, 978-80 (1971).
33. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-6-2 (2d Repl. 1972).
34. N.M. Stat. Ann.§§57-1-1 to -49 (Repl. 1962).
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Abandonment of dependent consists of a person having the
ability and means to provide for the support of her or his spouse
and minor child, and abandoning or failing to provide for such
support and thereby leaving such spouse or minor child dependent
on public support.
Whoever commits abandonment of a dependent is guilty of a
fourth degree felony.
RAPE

During the Congressional debates on the federal Equal Rights
Amendment, Congresswoman Martha Griffiths, a leader in the
struggle for its passage, assured her colleagues:
This law does not apply to criminal acts capable of commission
of only one sex. It does not have anything to do with the law of
rape or prostitution. You are not going to have to change those
laws.

35

Congressman White was one of those who disagreed:
Criminal laws such as rape, seduction, certain types of assault
36
that now apply only to men could be challenged.

In New Mexico, the crime of rape is committed by "a male
causing a female other than his wife to engage in sexual
intercourse without her consent. . . ."37 Sexual intercourse is
defined as "penetration of the vagina of a female to any extent by
the penis of a male."' 38 By definition, this offense is one that only
a man is capable of committing, and the distinction could
therefore be sustained as based on a unique physical characteristic of men. By limiting the definition of the prohibited act to a
35. 116 Cong. Rec. 28005 (1970).
36. 116 Cong. Rec. 28012 (1970).
37. The statute reads:
Rape consists of a male causing a female other than his wife to engage in sexual
intercourse with him without her consent, and when committed under any of the
following circumstances:
A. When the female's resistance is forcibly overcome;
B. When the female is unconscious or physically powerless to resist;
C. When the female is incapable of giving her consent because of mental
disability of which the male has knowledge; or
D. When the female's resistance is prevented by the effect of any alcoholic
liquor, narcotic drug or other substance being administered to the female by the
male or with his privity, for the purpose of preventing the female's resistance unless
the female voluntarily consumes or allows the administration of the substance with
knowledge of its nature.
Whoever commits rape is guilty of a second degree felony.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-9-2 (2d repl. 1972).
38. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40A-9-1 (2d Repl. 1972).
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penetration of the vagina, thereby excluding anal and oral sex
acts, the limitation of the statute's protection to females may also
be sustained as based on a unique physical characteristic of
39
women.
Whether or not the statutory classifications could be justified
under the Equal Rights Amendment, however, a revision might
be more consistent with the policies underlying the Amendment.
Such a revision would impose criminal sanctions on any person
other person, regardless of the sex of
who sexually assaults 4any
0
the actor or the victim.
SEXUAL OFFENSES AGAINST MINORS

The New Mexico Criminal Code contains several statutes
dealing with sexual offenses against minors.
42
4
Two of the statutes, statutory rape ' and rape of a child,
impose criminal penalties on males who have sexual intercourse 43 with females under specified ages. Females who have
intercourse with males under the same ages are not affected by
the two statutes. Unlike forcible rape, these offenses do not
permit a defense of consent. 44 This type of distinction has been
justified by courts on a theory "of the legal incapacity of a female
below the statutory age to give a meaningful consent to the
39. For an analysis of the arguments that may be made in attacking or defending this kind of
rape statute, see Brown. Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: Constitutional Basisfor Equal Rightsfor Women, 80 Yale L.Rev. 871.956 (1971).
40. If the sexual assault were defined to include those acts now included in the sodomy statute,
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-9-6 (2d Repl. 1972), the legislature should consider repealing the sodomy
statute. The only independent significance the statute would have would be to regulate sexual
conduct between consenting adults. For an excellent discussion of the constitutionality of such
dissenting).
regulation, see State v. Trejo, No. 748 (Ct. App. Feb. 4, 1972) (Sutin, J.,
41. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-9-3 (2d Repl. 1972) provides:
Statutory rape.-Statutory rape consists of the commission of sexual intercourse
by a male with a female other than his wife when the female is under the age of
sixteen [161 years.
A reasonable belief on the part of the male at the time of the alleged crime that
the female was sixteen [161 years of age or older is a defense to criminal liability for
statutory rape.
Whoever commits statutory rape is guilty of a fourth degree felony, except that if
the male is twenty-one [21] years of age or older, he is guilty of a third degree
felony.
42. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-9-4 (2d Repl. 1972) provides:
Rape ofa child.-Rape of a child is committed when a male has sexual intercourse
with a female who is under the age of thirteen [13] years, regardless of the male's
knowledge of or mistaken belief about her age.
Whoever commits rape of a child is guilty of a first degree felony.
43. " 'Sexual intercourse' means penetration of the vagina of a female to any extent by the
penis of a male." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-9-IA (2d Repl. 1972).
44. State v. Richardson, 48 N.M. 544, 154 P.2d 224 (1944).
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intercourse-a rationalization that is reminiscent of the general
contractual incapacity of minors and the formerly general
common law disabilities of married women. '45 There is no
reason to believe male children are any more capable than
female children of giving a meaningful consent to intercourse.
The other statutes in this area apply to males and females
alike. The aggravated sodomy statute applies to "a person
committing the crime of sodomy with a child under the age of
thirteen years ....*"46 [Emphasis supplied.] Either sex may be
guilty of sexual assault, which consists of:
A. any indecent handling or touching of any person under the
age of sixteen [ 16] years; or
B. any indecent demonstration or exposure of, upon or in the
presence of any person under the age of sixteen [161 years.
A reasonable belief on the part of the person that the victim at
the time of the alleged crime was sixteen [16] years
of age or older
47
is a defense to criminal liability for sexual assault.

It would be a simple matter to make the former statutes as
sexually neutral as the latter. 48 Whether or not such a revision
would be necessary, it would have the virtue of avoiding any
uncertainty about the constitutionality of these provisions.
45. L. Kanowitz, Women and the Law: 'the Unfinished Revolution 19 (1969).
46. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-9-7 (2d Repl. 1972).
47. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40A-9-99 (2d Repl. 1972). N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-9-10 (2d Repl. 1972) is
also sexually neutral on its face:
Enticement of child.-Enticement of child consists of:
A. enticing, persuading or attempting to persuade a child under the age of sixteen
[16] years to enter any vehicle, building, room or secluded place with intent to
commit an act which would constitute a crime under Article 9 of the Criminal
Code; or
B. having possession of a child under the age of scxteen [16] years in any vehicle,
building, room or secluded place with intent to commit an act which would
constitute a crime under Article 9 of the Criminal Code.
Whoever commits enticement of child is guilty of a misdemeanor.
48. E.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §_40A-9-3 (2d Repl. 1972) could be amended to provide:
Sexual Misconduct.-Sexual misconduct consists of a person eighteen years of age
or older engaging in a sexual act with any other person under the age of sixteen
years who is not the spouse of the actor.
A reasonable belief on the part of the actor at the time of the alleged crime that
the other person was sixteen years of age or older is a defense to prosecution under
this section.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §,40-9-4 (2d Repl. 1972) could provide:
Sexual Abuse of a Child. Sexual abuse of a child consists of a person engaging in
a sexual act with any other person under the age of thirteen years.
The "sexual act" would consist of the acts of sexual intercourse and sodomy described in
§ 40A-9-IA and § 40A-9-6. That portion of § 40A-9-7 prohibiting acts of sodomy with children
under the age of thirteen should then be repealed.
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PROSTITUTION

At common law, prostitution was an offense that could be
committed only by women. In the New Mexico Criminal Code,
however, a prostitute is "a person who engages in, or offers to
engage in, sexual intercourse for hire." 49 [Emphasis added.] The
language of the other statutory provisions 50 relating to prostitution is similarly neutral with regard to the sex of the actor. The
only exception is the abduction statute prohibiting "enticing,
taking or carrying away of a female under the age of twenty-one
years with intent to induce her to become a prostitute. ' 51 This
statute is particularly vulnerable under the Equal Rights
Amendment, since under the Code, either a male or female
52
apparently can be a prostitute.
Three potential areas of conflict with the Equal Rights
Amendment exist in the prostitution provisions, despite their
sexually neutral wording. First, there is the problem posed by
discriminatory enforcement of the statute: "Though the law itself
be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet if it is applied
and administered . by public authority with an evil eye and an
unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances,
material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still, within
the prohibition of the constitution. . . ,,15 In responding to a
challenge to alleged discriminatory enforcement of the statutes
against female prostitutes, the prosecution might point out that
the statute is employed primarily against females because males
who sell access to their bodies generally perform sexual acts other
than "penetration of the vagina . . . by the penis."5 4 This
argument raises the second problem: Do the statutes unlawfully
discriminate against women by covering sexual acts generally
performed by women who sell access to their bodies and not
those generally performed by men in similar situations? Perhaps
the sexual impartiality in the prostitution provisions is illusory. If
so, the Legislature should consider rewriting the prostitution laws
49. N.M. Stat. Ann..§40A-9- ID (2d Repl. 1972).
50. N.M. Stat. Ann.§§ 40A-9-11 to -18 (2d Repl. 1972).
51. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40A-9-19(2d Repl. 1972).
52. Amending the statute to replace "female" with "person" and to add "or him" after "her"
would cure any Equal Rights problem. An outright repeal would be preferable, however, since the
statute deals with acts that are covered under other statutes. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-6-3
and -§ 40A-9-13 (2d Repl. 1972).
53. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356(1886).
54. N.M. Stat. Ann..§40A-9-IA (2d Repl. 1972).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

to include the kinds of commercial sex acts performed by
males. 55
The third potential area of conflict lies in the fact that most
sellers of the kind of sexual intercourse covered by the prostitution laws are women and most buyers are men. However, the
penalties for the patron 56 are less severe than those for the
57
prostitute.
More importantly, the patrons are rarely arrested and prosecuted for hiring a prostitute.5 8 Even though the courts may well
sustain a classification which distinguishes between the buyer and
seller in a prostitution transaction, the Legislature might wish to
reconsider its own justifications for that classification.
SEDUCTION AND COMPELLING MARRIAGE

Two statutes which apparently are based on outdated stan59
dards of courting and morality are those prohibiting seduction
and unlawfully compelling marriage. 60 They are patently discriminatory in that they apply their criminal penalties only to men.
Unless the Legislature wishes to make it a crime for a woman to
seduce a man or for a woman to force a man to marry her, these
statutes should be removed from the books. They have outlived
whatever usefulness they once may have had.
CONCLUSION

Although the Equal Rights Amendment will not greatly affect
the criminal law in New Mexico, it will have an impact on some
statutes in the Criminal Code that make impermissible classifications based on sex. The Legislature could respond to the mandate
of the Amendment by replacing the terms in a statute referring to
a particular gender by a neutral term such as "person." This
simple method of avoiding possible judicial invalidation of the
55. A more desirable solution would be to excise those provisions regulating sexual conduct
between consenting adults from the criminal law. Cf. State v. Trejo, No. 748 (Ct.App. Feb. 4,
1972) (Sutin, J., dissenting).
56. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-9-11 (2d Repl. 1972) provides: "Whoever commits prostitution is
uilty of a petty misdemeanor, unless such crime is a second or subsequent conviction, in which
case such person is guilty of a misdemeanor."
57. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-9-12 (2d Repl. 1972) provides: "Whoever commits patronizing of
prostitutes is guilty of a petty misdemeanor."
58. L. Kanowitz, Women and the Law: The Unfinished Revolution 16-17 (1969).
59. N.M. Stat. Ann. §,40A-10-4 (2d Repl. 1972).
60. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-10-5 (2d Repl. 1972).
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statutes, however, may not be the most desirable one. The
examination made necessary by the Equal Rights Amendment
will provide an opportunity for reevaluation of the affected
statutes, particularly those dealing with sexual offenses, in light of
current realities. Hopefully, the Legislature will be able to take
advantage of that opportunity.

